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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES IN STRICT LIABILITY
WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR.t
Whether a consumer transaction that involves both a product and
a service should be subjected to strict liability is an issue that has long
troubled the courts. In part, this difficulty stemsfrom the courts'failure
to explore thoroughly the rationales underlying strict products liability.
Professor Powers explores the various rationales advanced to support
strict liability and concludes that only one, the dfficulties ofproof in
products cases, supports the selective imposition of strict liability to
products transactions. With this rationale identyfed, the courts can dis-
tinguish hybrid sales-service cases based on the dfficulty ofproving the
negligent act. This approach will makepossible a more principled reso-
lution of the sales-services cases.
Because strict products liability applies its special standard of liability se-
lectively,' courts must be able to identify cases that fall within its scope. This
task has been especially difficult in cases involving service transactions. Al-
though most courts have held that "pure" services are beyond the scope of
strict products liability because they are not "product sales," 2 many transac-
tions are difficult to classify because they involve both a service and a prod-
uct.3 Courts have relied on various rationales to determine whether individual
hybrid sales-service cases are governed by strict liability,4 but have failed to
t Professor of Law, University' of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1967, California (Berkeley); J.D.
1973, Harvard. The author wishes to thank David Robertson, Michael Sharlot, Guy Wellborn
and Scott McCown for their helpful comments.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) applies to "[o]ne who sells any prod-
uct in a defective condition... if... the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product." The "special" nature of the strict products liability standard is primarily the fact that,
unlike negligence, it purports to eschew an examination of the defendant's conduct. Although I
have argued elsewhere that the distinction between defectiveness in strict products liability and
negligence is often illusory, see Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L.
REv. 777 (1983), my concern here is the scope of strict products liability, assuming that its stan-
dard of liability is distinct from negligence, as it purports to be.
2. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954) (warranty); Hoffman v.
Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975) (strict tort liability).
3. See, e.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aft'd, 54
N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (permanent wave solution applied by beauty parlor held to be
product sale); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974) (retailer of
tires who failed to tighten lug nuts not covered by strict products liability).
4. While the purpose of this Article is not to focus on the law of one jurisdiction, a sampling
of supreme court decisions in various jurisdictions does not reflect the ad hoc nature of the deci-
sions concerning the sales-service distinction. Seemingly inconsistent decisions in different juris-
dictions can be explained as merely adopting different approaches. The struggle of the courts in a
single jurisdiction to reconcile the law in this area is much more instructive of the need for a
general, comprehensive approach. The attempts of the Texas courts to grapple with the sales-
service distinction typify the ad hoc nature of the decisions. They have decided eleven cases
involving hybrid sales-service transactions, and a comprehensive approach is yet to emerge. See
G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (rex. 1982) (construction and sale of house not gov-
erned by U.C.C.); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist not strictly liable for
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develop a comprehensive approach to distinguish "products" from "services."
One impediment to a comprehensive analysis in hybrid sales-service cases
is that the sales-service problem actually consists of four distinct issues that
courts often combine. One issue, which is the primary focus of this Article, is
how "products" and "services" are to be distinguished. For example, a
plumber who improperly installs a water heater might be dealing in a product
(an installed water heater) or a service (installation).5
A second issue is whether a transaction that involves a product involves a
"sale" of the product. This issue is common in hybrid sales-service cases be-
cause service providers often use products while rendering their services. For
example, a permanent wave solution is clearly a product, but it is unclear
whether a beauty salon that has applied it to a customer has sold it or merely
used it while performing a service.6 Similarly, defective hypodermic needles
and hospital gowns are clearly products, but has a doctor who has used the
needles or a hospital that has issued the gowns sold them to the patients? 7
A third issue is whether defendants engaged in a profession merit special
treatment. Many of the sales-service cases have arisen in situations involving
professional services, especially health care services,8 and it is often unclear
whether a court's analysis applies equally to nonprofessional services. A final
issue is whether the sales-service distinction in cases relying on strict tort lia-
improperly fitted contact lenses); Navarro County Elec. Coop. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982) (implied warranty of merchantability not applicable to transmission of electric-
ity); Thomas v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (hospital may be held
strictly liable to patient supplied with flammable gown); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d
127 (rex. Civ. App. 1980) (hospital liable under implied warranty of merchantability for contami-
nated drug); Langford v. Kraft, 551 S.W.2d 392 (rex. Civ. App. 1977) (stating in dictum that strict
liability is not applicable to services); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Cir. App.
1975) (contaminated water supply governed by strict liability); Ethicon v. Parten, 520 S.W,2d 527
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (doctor not strictly liable for defective needle used during operation); Erwin
v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (strict liability inapplica-
ble to transmission of electricity); City of Denton v. Gray, 501 S.W.2d 151 (rex. Civ. App. 1973)
(strict liability not applicable to flooding caused by supplier of water); Shivers v. Good Shepherd
Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (hospital not liable under warranty theory or strict
tort liability for contaminated drug). See also Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1972) (hospital not strictly liable for injuries caused by defective needle because not a
seller under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965)); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971).
5. Compare O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977) (strict
liability may be applied to defective installation of furnace) and Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525,
148 N.W.2d 385 (1967) (strict liability applied to defectively installed water softener) with Hoover
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974) (strict liability not applicable to
retailer who failed to tighten lug nuts while installing new tire).
6. See Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aff'd, 54 N.J.
585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Thomas v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (strict
liability applies to hospital that bailed defective hospital gown to patient); Ethicon v. Parten, 520
S.W.2d 527 (rex. Civ. App. 1975) (strict liability does not apply to doctor who injured patient by
using defective needle); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), a ffd sub
nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968) (strict liability does not apply
to dentist who injured patient with defective hypodermic needle), aff'dper curlam, 53 N.J. 260, 250
A.2d 129 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (rex. 1968) (optometrist); Providence Hosp.
v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127 (rex. Civ. App. 1981) (hospital); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256
N.W.2d 379 (1977) (surgeon and anesthesiologist).
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bility is the same as the sales-service distinction in cases relying on the war-
ranty provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.9
Each of these issues is important in its own right.10 The primary purpose
of this Article is to examine the first issue: the distinction between products
and services. Nevertheless, the other three issues are relevant because courts
have intertwined all four issues in cases involving hybrid sales-service transac-
tions. Because most sales-service cases involve more than one of the four is-
sues, it is often difficult to determine what a particular case holds for any one
of them, especially since courts have not always distinguished carefully among
them. 1
Courts must disentangle these related but distinct issues before progress
9. See, e.g., Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), ad sub nona
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968) (explicitly conflating warranty and
tort analysis of sales-service distinction), ajf'dper curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969); G-W-
L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982) (sales-service distinction under U.C.C. analyzed
without reference to precedents involving § 402A); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (§ 402A cases explicitly held inapplicable to warranty case).
10. For example, even in strict liability cases that do not involve services, it is often difficult
to determine whether a "sale" (or something sufficiently close to a sale such as a bailment or lease)
has taken place. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966 (Ala. 1978)
(demonstration); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (lease); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374 (rex. 1978) (bailment); Mc-
Kisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (free sample).
Moreover, plausible arguments can be made to exempt professionals from strict liability even
if nonprofessionals would be covered. See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379
(1977); Crump & Maxwell, Should Health Service Providers Be Strictl Liable for Product-Related
Injuries? A Legal and Economic Anasis, 36 Sw. L.J. 831 (1982). Finally, the statutory mandate
of the Uniform Commercial Code may require different conclusions concerning the scope of Arti-
cle 2 than a court would adopt for the scope of strict liability. Section 2-102 provides that Article 2
applies to the "sale of goods." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). Section 2-105 provides: "'Goods' means
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of idebtifica-
tion to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities... and things in action .. " Id. § 2-105. This definition seems to exclude from the
scope of Article 2 pure services which a court could include within the ambit of strict tort liability.
It does not, then, help much to distinguish between goods and services in hybrid sales-service
cases. Thus, the statute prevents a court from adopting the same test for distinguishing between
products and services under Article 2 and § 402A, assuming that it has excluded pure services
from strict tort liability.
Of course, even if services are not covered by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a
court could impose common-law warranty liability. See Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35,
151 So. 2d 767 (1963); cf. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (rex. 1968) (implied warranty of
habitability for new house).
11. For example, in Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (rex. 1968), the court held that strict
tort liability did not apply to an injury caused by contact lenses that had been improperly fitted by
plaintifis optometrist. The court relied on two facts. First, defendants were licensed optometrists
whose profession was statutorily recognized and regulated. See TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 4552
(Vernon 1976). The court recognized that defendants, who had statewide offices under the name
of Texas State Optical, "[fell] between those ordinarily associated with the practice of a profession
and ... a merchandising concern," Barbee, 425 S.W.2d at 345, but it nevertheless concluded that
defendants were engaged in a professional activity. Second, the alleged defect (improper fit) was
due to the diagnostic, service component of the transaction rather than to an impurity in the lens
itself. "The miscarriage, if such there was, rests in the professional acts of the [optometrists] and
not in the commodity they prescribed, fitted and sold." Id. at 346. The latter point might be a
useful basis for distinguishing between products and services generally, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 14-77, but the court did not clarify whether this point is relevant in cases not involving
professional services. The ambiguity of the holding in Barbee is illustrated by the cases interpret-
ing it. See supra note 4. Barbee cannot even be unequivocally interpreted to exclude the applica-
tion of strict products liability to pure services outside the area of professional services. But see
19841
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
can be made toward a comprehensive approach to the sales-service distinction.
While the focus is on the distinction between products and services in strict
tort liability, it is important to understand that a court's apparent position on
this issue may be influenced by the court's failure to disentangle it from one or
more of the other three issues.
Even if courts separate the product-service distinction from these other
issues, the distinction itself poses problems that have a dual significance. In
addition to impeding the resolution of specific cases, the failure to develop a
comprehensive approach to the product-service distinction reveals a latent
general problem of strict products liability. A premise of strict products liabil-
ity is that product injuries constitute a discrete, integral problem that merits
special treatment. Otherwise, it would be inappropriate to distinguish product
injuries from other personal injuries, liability for which is governed by negli-
gence. But courts have not always clearly articulated the features of a product
case and the policies they evoke that distinguish product injuries from other
personal injuries. Without a clear understanding of why products cases are
distinct, it has been difficult to ascertain what constitutes a products case in
borderline situations presented by hybrid product-service transactions.
Both the proponents and opponents of strict products liability have relied
on various general arguments to support their respective positions.12 Many of
the arguments on both sides, however, do not distinguish between product in-
juries and other personal injuries; they apply equally to all personal injury
cases. 13 Consequently, they do not explain the selective use of strict liability in
products cases, and they do not help identify "products cases" in borderline
situations. The difficulty courts have encountered in defining the boundaries
of strict products liability in the hybrid product-service cases reflects this un-
derlying confusion about the values that strict products liability purports to
embody.
Langford v. Kraft, 551 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Sales, An Overydew of Strict Tort
Liabiiiy in Texas, I IHous. L. REv. 1043, 1066 (1974).
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court has distinguished between a dentist, whose patient
was injured by a defective hypodermic needle, and a beauty salon, whose customer was injured by
the application of a hair wave solution. The court held that strict liability applied to the beauty
salon but not to the dentist. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11
(1968) (distinguishing Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228,227 A.2d 539 (1967), afdsub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 100 NJ. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), a f'd er curiain, 53 N.J. 259, 250
A.2d 129 (1969), aft'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969)). The distinction might be explained on
either of two grounds: (1) the difference between professional and nonprofessional services; or (2)
the hair wave solution had been "sold" whereas the hypodermic needle had not. See Newmark,
102 N.J. Super. at 287, 246 A.2d at 16 (adopting the latter rationale). The court also casually
conflated tort and warranty analyses, see Magrine, 94 N.J. Super. at 228 n.2, 227 A.2d at 539 n.2,
whereas other courts have either explicitly or implicitly distinguished between them, see, e.g., G-
W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Consequently, the court's position on any one of these issues is unclear.
12. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liabiliy: The Gathering Storm, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct.
1977, at 15; Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liabilitfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803 (1976); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973); Cowan, Some Policy Bases ofProducts Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1077 (1965); Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 391, 393-94 (1980).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 14-77.
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This Article examines the product-service distinction from the perspective
of developing a coherent, workable standard for distinguishing services and
products in specific cases, and from the perspective of gaining insight into the
larger structure of strict products liability. Part I attempts to develop a com-
prehensive approach that can be used by courts to analyze cases on the prod-
uct-service boundary of strict products liability. It concludes that courts should
adopt an approach that attends to the reasons for distinguishing in the first
place between product injuries and other personal injuries that are governed
by negligence. Part II then explores some of the implications that the hybrid
product-service cases have for strict products liability generally.
I. TOWARD A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PRODUCT-SERVICE
DISTINCTION
A general approach to the product-service distinction requires resolution
of two related but distinct questions: (1) whether to include pure services
within the scope of strict products liability; and (2) if pure service transactions
are excluded, how to distinguish between products and services in hybrid
product-service transactions. Although these two questions are distinct, they
are also related: distinguishing between products and services in hybrid cases
should be resolved consistently with the reasons for treating products and
services differently in the first place.
A. The Basic Product-Service Distinction
While some commentators have argued that strict liability should apply
to commercial services, 14 nearly all courts have refused to extend strict prod-
ucts liability to pure service transactions.' 5 There has not been a similar con-
sensus about the reason for excluding services from strict products liability,
however.
1. "Legislative" history
One argument is that the "authors" of section 402A did not "intend" to
include pure service transactions within its scope. 16 Although the language of
14. See Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and
Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661; Comment, Guidelinesfor Extending Implied War-
ranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 365 (1976); Note, Continuing the Common Law
Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Liabiliy to Consumer Services,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 401 (1974).
15. See, eg., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1968); Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 839 (Alaska 1967), Hoffman v.
Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270
Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974). But see Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767
(1963) (per curiam) (warranty theory).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965). This type of argument is persuasive
concerning the scope of Article 2 of the U.C.C., since it explicitly refers to "transactions in goods."
See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1970). This does not preclude courts from developing common-law warran-
ties in pure service transactions, however, since they have done so in other areas that are clearly
beyond the scope of Article 2. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (certain real
1984]
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section 402A appears to exclude service transactions, 17 courts should not inter-
pret it as though it were a statute. While courts are understandably influenced
by section 402A in difficult cases, principled common-law development is
often thwarted when courts blindly abdicate to its language. Moreover, even if
the language of section 402A provides a persuasive argument for excluding
pure service transactions from strict liability, this does not advance the analy-
sis in hybrid sales-service transactions because it does not explain why prod-
ucts are treated differently than services.
2. Defectiveness is meaningless for services
A second argument is that the concept of defectiveness or an implied war-
ranty makes little sense when applied to service transactions.18 The salient
feature of defectiveness is that (unlike negligence) it purports to evaluate the
product rather than the manufacturer's conduct. 19 Since a service necessarily
involves "conduct" rather than a "product," a court would be required to eval-
uate the defendant's conduct if strict liability were applied to services.
This rationale is unconvincing. Courts can distinguish between negli-
gence and defectiveness even in service transactions by evaluating the results
of the service rather than the service provider's conduct, which would be ap-
propriate under negligence.20 Under this approach, a doctor who misdiag-
nosed an ailment would have rendered a "defective" service from the
perspective of our knowledge at the time of trial, even if the diagnosis was
reasonable from the perspective of what the doctor should have known when
the diagnosis was made. The practical problem of confusing negligence and
defectiveness might be exacerbated in service transactions, since the defend-
ant's conduct is scrutinized, but there is no conceptual bar to applying strict
liability to services.
3. The "tunnel vision" approach
A third rationale for excluding services focuses on specific aspects of serv-
ice transactions that make them inappropriate for strict liability. For example,
in Gagne v. Bertran,21 the California Supreme Court refused to apply strict
estate transactions). This is not to say that courts should develop common-law warranties for serv-
ices, however.
17. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) repeatedly refers to the sale of a
"product," and it appears in a chapter of the Restatement entitled "Suppliers of Chattels." All of
the examples used in the comments are tangible chattels. It is reasonable to conclude that the
authors of § 402A had tangible products rathier than services in mind.
18. See, e.g., Lewis v. Big Powderhouse Mountain Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App. 437, 245 N.W.2d
81(1976).
19. See Phillips v. Kinwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974);
Powers, supra note 1, at 778.
20. For example, hindsight might reveal that an architectural design was "defective," even
though the danger it failed to guard against was unforeseeable at the time the design was made. I
have argued elsewhere that the distinction between hindsight and foresight is sometimes illusory,
Powers, supra note 1, but this problem is just as applicable to products as it is to services.
21. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954). Gagne predates strict tort liability, but the opinion's
reasoning might be applied to strict tort liability. -
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liability to a soil engineer because consumers do not expect services to be free
from defects:
[The engineer] was selling service and not insurance. Thus, the gen-
eral rule is applicable that those who sell their services for the gui-
dance of others in their economic, financial, and personal affairs are
not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct.
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill.
They have the duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of
members of their profession, and a failure to discharge that duty will
subject them to liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons
are not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reason-
able care and competence. They purchase service not insurance. 22
The problem with this argument is that the same could be said of those
who select product manufacturers. Arguments favoring negligence over strict
liability or vice versa can be made for any type of accident. 23 The issue, how-
ever, is to determine the appropriate treatment of services in a system that
distinguishes between product injuries and other personal injuries. The argu-
ment in Gagne does not itself distinguish service transactions from product
sales and therefore does not justify their distinct treatment.24
This "tunnel vision" approach, which focuses solely on the nature of the
service transactions, has been used elsewhere with more sophistication. One
commentator has developed a complicated model based on information and
marketing theory and concluded that strict liability would be desirable in
some service transactions.25 The analysis usefully distinguishes among differ-
ent types of service transactions, and it offers reasons why strict liability would
be desirable in some of them, but it does not even attempt to demonstrate that
the arguments favoring strict liability are stronger in service transactions than
in other situations, such as automobile accidents, in which strict liability is
clearly inapplicable. Consequently, the argument does not justify the selective
use of strict liability in service transactions when negligence is required in
other personal injury cases.
4. One-way analogies
A fourth type of argument looks beyond the features of service transac-
tions alone and compares service cases to other types of cases, the resolution of
which is known or assumed. For example, proponents of strict liability have
argued that the policies supporting strict liability in product cases (such as risk
22. Id. at 487-89, 275 P.2d at 20-21.
23. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972); Posner,
supra note 12.
24. Of course, it can be argued that consumer expectations actually are different in service
transactions than in product transactions, see Note, supra note 12, at 397-98, but this point re-
quires independent support that was not the basis of the decision in Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d
481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954). Mere conclusions to this effect are insufficient.
25. Comment, supra note 14.
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spreading) are also applicable to services.26 Conversely, an opponent of strict
liability for services has argued that the policies supporting the rejection of
strict liability for medical services are equally applicable to nonmedical
services.27
These "one-sided" analogies are helpful, but they overlook the possibility
that services also may be analogous to other cases in which the legal treatment
is different. For example, services may be analogous to products because, in
each situation, accident costs can be internalized into price and spread among
consumers. But the accident costs of any activity also could be internalized
into the "price" of the activity by subjecting it to strict liability.28 This feature
of services makes them analogous both to products and to other accident-caus-
ers normally governed by negligence, and consequently it does not select be-
tween the divergent treatment given to product injuries and other accidents.
Other accidents, such as automobile accidents, and product injuries share
common features, yet they are treated differently. Service transactions share
common features with each. Consequently, one-sided analogies are not very
helpful. Courts should ascertain what distinguishes product cases from other
accidents (and why) and then determine whether service cases are more akin
to one or the other in light of the reasons for distinguishing between them in
the first place. One-sided analogies fail to do this.
5. Two-way analogies
Some courts have gone beyond one-sided analogies and have relied on
policies that distinguish products injuries cases from other personal injuries
and thereby justify strict liability in product cases even though negligence is
required elsewhere. For example, in Lemley v. J & B Tire Co. 29 the court
reasoned that product cases are distinct because they present victims with
acute problems of proof. A manufacturer's conduct normally has occurred at
a time and place remote from the accident, making it difficult for a plaintiff to
ascertain specific facts about the manufacturer's behavior. Problems of proof
are not usually as acute in nonproduct cases because the defendant's alleged
26. See, e.g., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968) (Botter, J., dissent-
ing), aft'dper curiam, 53 NJ. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969); Greenfield, Supra note 14; Note, supra note
14.
27. See Sales, The Sales-Service Transaction: .4 Citadel Under .4ssault, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
13, 36 (1978).
28. For automobile accidents, spreading costs would be effected through the mechanism of
nearly universal insurance rather than through market prices, but the risk spreading argument
does not distinguish between these mechanisms. In either case, accident costs would be spread
throughout the relevant population. Another major problem with the risk spreading argument as
an explanation of strict products liability is that it would also apply to the accident costs of nonde-
fective products. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
One commentator has argued that risk spreading distinguishes between products and services
because manufacturers are normally larger than service providers and therefore can more easily
spread costs. See Note, supra note 12, at 396. Putting aside the empirical validity of this claim
(especially given that small product retailers are not exempt from strict products liability), it over-
looks the fact that the actual spreading mechanism is insurance, and insurance makes the size of a
particular product or service provider irrelevant.
29. 426 F.Supp. 1378, 1380 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (mem.).
[Vol. 62
STRICT LIABILITY
negligent conduct is more likely to be accessible to the plaintiff. The Lemley
court then concluded that this distinguishing feature of products cases was not
a salient feature of repair transactions, and consequently it refused to hold a
repairman strictly liable.
Regardless of the specific result in Lemley, the court's basic approach is
sound. Rather than making general references to arguments favoring or disfa-
voring strict liability, the court focused on specific policies that distinguish
product injuries from other personal injuries and that therefore justify the se-
lective use of strict liability in products cases.3
0
The key to this approach is identifying policies that distinguish products
injuries from other personal injuries. Many of the policies advanced to sup-
port products liability are convincing within the context of a specific products
case, but they are equally applicable to nonproducts cases. Consequently, they
do not explain the distinct treatment products cases receive.
(a). Incentives to promote safety
One common rationale for strict products liability is that it will promote
product safety,3 1 because requiring manufacturers to bear accident costs re-
gardless of negligence gives them an incentive to produce safer products. This
argument is controversial even on its own terms. It is debatable both analyti-
cally and empirically whether strict liability increases product safety, much
less tends to optimize it.3 2 More importantly for the present inquiry, however,
is that this argument fails to distinguish between product injuries and other
personal injuries. Strict liability for automobile accidents would also internal-
30. One commentator has also used this type of analysis to develop a comprehensive ap-
proach to hybrid sales-service cases. Note, supra note 12. My disagreement with his conclusions is
not based on the style of the argument, but rather on the policies that actually can be used to
distinguish product cases from the rest of personal injury law. See infra text accompanying notes
31-60.
31. See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977); Epstein, supra note 12,
at 19-20; see also Note, supra note 12, at 393.
32. Strictly speaking, "safer" products are not the goal. Any product could be made safer
with some design change, but that in turn might make the product unduly expensive or detract
from its utility. The appropriate goal is for manufacturers to design products with an optimal
level of safety. Optimal safety, in turn, requires incentives for both manufacturers and consumers.
Theoretically, negligence coupled with the defense of contributory negligence provides incentives
that tend to optimize safety, while strict liability without contributory negligence does not. See,
e.g., Brown, Towardan Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 323, 338-43 (1973); Epstein,
supra note 12, at 19-20; Posner, supra note 12, at 209.
Of course, consumers and manufacturers both have incentives for safety other than legal
rules, which may justify results that contradict theoretical models, even if the goal were merely to
optimize safety. But the practical impact of strict liability on product safety is unclear. As Judge
Posner has noted, "the question is at bottom empirical, and the empirical work has not been
done." Posner, supra note 12, at 212. The existing empirical evidence does not reflect a consensus.
See Whitford, Comment on a Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 91 YALE L.J. 1371
(1982). Compare Priest,A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1348 (1981)
(suggesting that strict liability may reduce product safety) with Note, An Empirical Study of the
Magnuson-Mloss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1117, 1137-46 (1979). It is not implausible to
attribute most of the increases in product safety to consumer pressure, direct governmental regula-
tion, or increased litigation that may have occurred even under negligence, rather than to changes
in the common law of products liability.
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ize the cost of accidents into the cost of driving, thereby providing an incentive
for safety.33 Incentives for safety might support strict liability generally (de-
pending on the empirical evidence), but they do not explain the selective appli-
cation of strict liability to product injuries. 34
(b). Risk spreading
A second common rationale for strict products liability is that it helps
internalize accident costs into a product's price to spread a victim's loss among
an entire group of consumers.35 Even if spreading risks is a desirable goal,
which is itself controversial, 36 it is not specific to product injuries. 37 Victims of
other accidents could also have their losses spread. In the case of automobile
accidents, a large class of cases governed solely by negligence, accident costs
could be spread among drivers through the mechanism of nearly universal
33. Ironically, product cases might be distinguished from nonproduct cases on the basis that
the liability rule has less impact on product manufacturers than on nonproduct tortfeasors. In
transactions subject to market forces, we might be less concerned with any allocative inefficiency
caused by a liability rule (here in terms of optimal safety) because the parties can bargain their
way back to an efficient result. For example, we may not be concerned that the entitlements given
to real property owners permit them to use their land frivolously because they pay the price of
foregoing a sale or rental at a value reflecting the more efficient use. To the extent that strict
liability is theoretically inefficient, it may be more tolerable in product cases in which a market
may mitigate its effect. The absence of a market among strangers prevents a similar mitigation of
inefficiency in automobile accidents, and we might therefore insist on a theoretically more efficient
liability rule, such as negigence. See generally Coase, The Problem o/Social Cost, 33. L. & ECON.
1 (1960); Powers, MethodologicaltPrspective on the Duty to Act (Book Review), 57 TEx. L. REV.
523, 529 & n.21 (1979) (reviewing M. S o, THE DTY TO AcT: TORT LAW, POWER, & PtLICPOLICY (1977)).
Of course, if this were the reason for distinguishing between products and nonproducts cases,
service transactions should be classified with the products cases, since they too are subject to mar-ket forces. No court has relied on this distinction, however, possibly because the actual impact of
liability rules on behavior is so uncertain and the presence of effective markets is doubtful, regard-less of the theoretical models.
34. One distinction between product injuries and other personal injuries may be that com-
mercial defendants are more susceptible to influence by economic incentives than are individuals.
If this were the rationale for the distinct treatment of product injuries, commercial services shouldbe treated like products, but no court has relied on this rationale. Indeed, this rationale would be
just as applicable to any injury caused by a commercial defendant, not merely one involvingproducts or services.
One commentator has argued that services and products can be distinguished because incen-
tives are more effective against product manufacturers than service providers. See Note, supra
note 12, at 396-97. This conclusion is pure conjecture, and intuition suggests it is incorrect. See
Greenfield, supra note 14, at 700-01.
35. See, g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 862 (5th Cir. 1967), cert de-
nied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462. 150 P.2d 436, 441(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391
(1977); Epstein, supra note 12, at 19-20. This rationale often parades under the banner of the
defendant s financial ability to bear the loss. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337,
343, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 295-96, 509 P.2d 529, 546 (1973) (en
bane) (Bryson, J., dissenting); Klemme, The Enterprise Liabiliy Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
Rnv. 153, 191-93 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 12, at 19-20. Indeed, some cases have declined to recognize
it as a significant policy underlying strict products liability. See, e.g., Brody v. Overlook Hosp.,
127 NJ. Super. 331, 341, 317 A.2d 392, 398 (1974), aff'dper curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596
(1975).
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automobile insurance. 38 Indeed, victims of disease and natural disaster are
indistinguishable from product victims from the perspective of spreading
losses. 39 Even more telling in the present context is that the argument for
spreading risks is equally powerful for injuries caused by nondefective prod-
ucts,40 yet recovery is uniformly denied in such cases. Although the rhetoric
of risk spreading is often used to support strict products liability for victims of
defective products, it does not justify the selective use of strict liability for
victims of defective products.
(c). Difculty ofproving spec Yc acts of negligence
A third rationale for strict products liability is that it is unduly burden-
some for a plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence in a products case.4 1
Proving negligence is difficult in any personal injury case. Witnesses may give
conflicting versions of the events, and the mechanism of the injury may have
been destroyed in the accident. The problem is more acute in products cases,
however, because the alleged negligence normally occurred at a place con-
trolled by the defendant before the plaintiff purchased the product. Although
this sometimes occurs in nonproduct cases, for example, when a motorist has
failed adequately to maintain his brakes, 42 products injuries present this prob-
lem more acutely than other injuries.43 Consequently, courts can consistently
relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving negligence in products cases while
requiring proof of negligence in other personal injury cases.44
38. Just as compensation in a product case tends to slightly raise a product's price, strict
liability in automobile accidents would tend to raise liability insurance rates. Although a court
might argue that a product's price is a better mechanism to spread risks than automobile insur-
ance, no court has done so. Moreover, such a distinction would be empirically dubious.
Another possible argument for distinguishing product injuries is that victims do not typically
insure against product injuries and therefore need another mechanism for spreading losses. Of
course, they could insure against product injuries, and they typically do not insure against most
types of loss through first party automobile insurance (maybe this tells us something about the
desirability of spreading these losses). Again, this argument does not distinguish product injuries
from other types of accidents.
Of course, if either of these distinctions were a basis of strict products liability, it would apply
equally to commercial services.
39. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 19-20.
40. Id.
41. See, eg., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 435, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring);
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976); Hoven v. Kelble, 79
Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (1977); Cowan, supra note 12, at 1087; Montgomery &
Owen, supra note 12, at 809; Note, supra note 12, at 395.
42. Indeed, the plaintiff's inability to gather evidence sometimes triggers the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, and at least one commentator has analogized strict products liability to res ipsa
loquitur. See Cowan, supra note 12, at 1094. Cf. Siegler v. Khulman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 453-60,
502 P.2d 1181, 1184-87 (1973) (comparing common law strict liability to res psa loquitur).
43. See supra note 41.
44. Improved discovery techniques and a more sophisticated plaintiffs bar may have miti-
gated the proof problem. Moreover, difficulties of proof might be remedied by shifting the burden
of proving the absence of negligence to the defendant, or by permitting the jury to draw an infer-
ence of negligence from the fact of defectiveness. The present issue, however, is not the continu-
ing wisdom of strict products liability compared to its alternatives; it is whether plausible reasons
exist to explain why courts single out products cases for special treatment. The special problems
of proof provide such a rationale.
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This rationale for strict products liability does not deny fault as the un-
derlying motivation for liability. It posits that negligence is a common cause
of defective products and that a plaintiff's inability toprove negligence is more
likely to be a consequence of the difficulty of proof than of the manufacturer's
not actually having been negligent. 45
This rationale is especially attractive because it harmonizes with specific
features of strict products liability in a way that other rationales do not. For
example, the "unavoidable danger" explanation of excluding hepatitis infected
blood plasma from strict liability4 6 and the "state of the art" defense 47 are
essentially grounded on conclusions that we could not have expected the man-
ufacturer to have made the product safer. Risk spreading does not explain
these defenses, since these risks are as worthy of spreading as any others. But
notwithstanding the normal inference of negligence from defectiveness, we are
usually convinced that a manufacturer was not negligent in cases involving
unavoidable dangers or state of the art technology. The plaintiff's failure to
prove negligence in these cases is not likely to be due merely to problems of
proof.48
Unlike other rationales, the proof rationale is also consistent with courts'
refusal to compensate victims of nondefective products. On one hand, a defect
raises a much stronger inference of negligence than does a mere injury. On
the other hand, while defectiveness is not always easy to prove, a plaintiff at
least has contemporaneous access to the product itself, mitigating the special
problems of proving negligence in a products case.49
The importance of the proof rationale of strict products liability is that
while it does not necessarily represent good policy, it does distinguish product
injuries from other personal injuries and thereby provides a plausible basis for
selectively eschewing negligence in product cases. Consequently, its applica-
tion to service cases can be used to ascertain whether they fall within the scope
45. Sometimes there will be "smoke without fire," but experience and intuition may suggest
that defectiveness implies negligence more often than not, even when the plaintiff cannot prove it.
The plaintiffs failure may simply be due to the acute problems of proof presented by a product
injury. See supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331,339-40, 317 A.2d 392, 397 (1974),
aft'dper curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975). But see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 47 11L 2d 443, 453-56, 266 N.E.2d 897, 902-03 (1970).
47. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976); Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 199-209, 447 A.2d 539, 544-49 (1982); Boatland of
Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980).
48. See Brody v. Overlook Hosp.. 127 N.J. Super. 331,339-40, 317 A.2d 392, 397 (1974), afT'd
per cur/am, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975).
49. The proof rationale does not explain the liability of retailers who have not been negli-
gent. The liability of retailers is due in part to the historical legacy of warranty law and to the
difficulty of obtaining local jurisdiction over a manufacturer who normally would be required to
indemnify the retailer. Since long-arm jurisdiction has undermined this rationale, the liability of
retailers may be vestigial.
One other rationale for manufacturer liability is that since the retailer is already liable, a
direct action against the manufacturer avoids the circuitous route of successive lawsuits. This
assumes that retailers are liable; it does not independently define situations in which strict liability
will be available against retailers. Consequently, it is no help in ascertaining whether or not serv-
ices fall within the scope of strict products liability.
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of strict liability.50
(d). Consumer expectations
A fourth rationale reflects the warranty heritage of strict products liabil-
ity: defective products frustrate consumer expectations. 5' Especially in early
cases, courts relied on general assurances of safety and quality that were found
in advertising or in the mere marketing of a product.5 2 The emphasis on con-
sumer expectations has waned, both as a test of defectiveness and as a reason
for liability.53 Courts have been willing to free products liability from its war-
ranty moorings, and concrete consumer expectations are difficult to ascertain
in any but the simplest cases.5 4 To the extent that consumer expectations re-
main a basis of strict products liability, however, this rationale justifies a dis-
tinction between products cases (in which bargains may create expectations)
and other personal injuries (in which they do not).5 5
(e). Manufacturers are in a better position to prevent injury
A fifth rationale for strict products liability is that it places the burden of
injuries on manufacturers, who are in a better position to prevent injury,
"rather than [on] the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves."'5 6 This rationale is itself controversial, 57 but more importantly, it does
not distinguish product injuries from other types of personal injuries. Victims
of automobile accidents are often "powerless" to protect themselves, and an
alleged tortfeasor is in a better position to prevent the loss. Indeed, in con-
sumer transactions the victim often has had at least the opportunity to select
the manufacturer, a choice not usually given to the victim of an automobile
accident.
ff). Manufacturers deliberately impose risks
A final rationale of strict products liability-relying on fairness-requires
a manufacturer to compensate victims because the manufacturer has deliber-
50. See infra text accompanying notes 74-84.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1964); Shapo,A Representa-
tional Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disap-
pointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974); Note, supra note 12, at 395.
52. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963); see also Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Heaton v. Ford Motor
Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342
A.2d 381 (1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326,
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979).
54. See Powers, supra note 1, at 794-97.
55. This rationale distinguishes product cases from automobile accident cases only to the
extent that the expectations created by bargains are special. Reliance and expectations are also
present in many nonbargaining situations. Automobile drivers, for example, routinely rely on
their expectations about the conduct of fellow drivers.
56. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963).
57. See, e.g., Klemme, supra note 36, at 191-92 n.107.
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ately imposed risks on consumers for its own benefit.58 Similar arguments
have been used to explain tort liability generally,59 and therein lies its weak-
ness as a justification for special treatment of product injuries. Motorists delib-
erately impose risks on pedestrians for their own benefit, yet proof of
negligence is still required.60
(g). Application of rationales to the product-service distinction
Of these rationales, only two explain the distinction between product in-
juries and other personal injuries: (1) the unique problems of proof a plaintiff
confronts in a products case; and (2) the tacit representations of safety that
constitute part of a consumer bargain. The other putative rationales for strict
product liability support strict tort liability generally, not its selective applica-
tion in cases involving defective products.61
58. See Cowan, supra note 12, at 1087-92.
59. See Fletcher, supra note 23. But see Coase, supra note 33; Posner, A Theory ofNeglI-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (arguing that the alleged tortfeasor no more imposes risks on
the victim than vice versa).
60. Indeed, this rationale provides a stronger argument for strict liability in accidents among
strangers than it does in many product cases. Since a manufacture's liability normally is passed on
to consumers, so the risks and benefits of a liability rule are distributed reciprocally. This is not
necessarily true for accidents among strangers. (In the most common form of accident among
strangers-automobile accidents-the rate structure of automobile insurance tends toward reci-
procity. Lack of reciprocity is a problem in accidents between drivers and pedestrians, but it is
similarly a problem in product injuries involving bystanders.)
Other arguments might be constructed to support strict products liability. For example, strict
products liability might rest on an argument similar to unit pricing in supermarkets. If accident
costs are internalized into a product's price, they are more visible to consumers, although the true
cost of the product (including risk) is unchanged. This, in turn, might help consumers to shop
comparatively and otherwise better allocate their resources. The problem with this argument (in
addition to its not having been used by courts) is that, like the spreading argument, it is incompati-
ble with the requirement of defectiveness. Of course, this could be remedied by dropping the
requirement of defectiveness, but that solution is very unlikely.
Another possible rationale is that strict products liability avoids technical obstacles (such as
timely notice) that plaintiffs face under the Uniform Commercial Code. See Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60,377 P.2d 897, 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. 692, 699 (1963). It is difficult
to take this argument seriously, since the obvious solution is to amend the U.C.C. Furthermore,
this rationale does not itself explain why we have implied warranties in the first place.
One source of difficulty in attempting to ascertain the rationales of strict products liability is
that many courts have been relatively silent about them or alluded to them in an unsystematic
way. For example, the Texas Supreme Court has alluded to the arguments that (1) manufacturers
are in a better position than the consumer to prevent harm; (2) the burden of proving specific acts
of negligence is unusually great in products cases; and (3) strict liability spreads risks among
consumers. See Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1942) (decided
prior to the adoption of§ 402A, but heavily relied upon after § 402A was adopted, see Boatland of
Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (Pope, J., concurring); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)). But the court has not purported to give a definitive
list of policies supporting strict products liability, and it has not excluded specifically arguments
that have been suggested by commentators or other courts. Thus, the courts of civil appeal can be
excused for their failure to develop a comprehensive approach to the sales-service distinction. See
supra note 4.
61. Four of the tangential rationales discussed in the notes distinguish between product inju-
ries and other personal injuries: (1) that market forces tend to mitigate inefficiencies created by.a
liability rule, see supra note 33; (2) that commercial defendants are more responsive to economic
incentives, see supra note 34; (3) that product price is a better spreading mechanism than personal
injury insurance, see supra note 38; and (4) that internalizing accident costs makes them explicit,
permitting consumers to make better purchasing decisions, see supra note 60. Since courts have
not relied on these arguments, I will not rely on them in my analysis. It should be noted, however,
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The two rationales that do distinguish between product injuries and other
personal injuries suggest opposing resolutions of cases involving pure services.
The rationale based on implicit representations of quality and safety seems to
be equally powerful in service cases, 62 since they too are "contractual" and
consequently give rise to consumer expectations. The proof rationale, how-
ever, distinguishes between services and products because the special obstacles
of proof encountered by plaintiffs in products cases are not as acute in service
cases. Alleged misconduct in service transactions often takes place at a loca-
tion accessible to the consumer after the consumer has chosen the service
provider.63
Depending on a court's choice between these rationales, a coherent liabil-
ity system could either include or exclude service cases from the scope of strict
liability. Although the proof problem better explains the special treatment
given to products cases,64 a court could plausibly rely on either rationale and
treat service cases either like products cases or like cases involving accidents
among strangers.
After a court makes this determination, however, its range of approaches
in hybrid cases is more limited. If it decides to treat services like products, the
hybrid cases cease to be problematic: they too would be governed by strict
liability. If a court decides to exclude pure services from strict liability, how-
ever, it must then decide whether to treat a hybrid case either like a product or
like a service. It is because most courts have declined to extend strict liability
to pure services65 that the hybrid cases continue to be perplexing.
At this point, however, the analysis can be simplified, because only the
proof rationale distinguishes products cases from automobile accidents and
from pure services cases. Although a court might vindicate the representation
rationale by extending strict liability to pure services, only the proof rationale
provides a satisfactory explanation for current law in jurisdictions that require
proof of defectiveness in products cases and exclude pure services from the
that each of them depends on the commercial nature of product cases and would apply equally to
all other commercial transactions, including services, and therefore would support including pure
service transactions within the scope of strict liability.
62. See Greenfield, supra note 14. One commentator has used this rationale to distinguish
between products and services, arguing that "[while purchasers of goods expect a product free of
defects, hirers of services normally contract for the services of an expert rather than for a particu-
lar result." Note, supra note 12, at 397. If this point is meant to be empirical, it is pure conjecture,
and probably wrong. Surely purchasers of products actually expect that some products are "lem-
ons." See Powers, supra note 1, at 796-97. In many cases consumers of services also expect a
result. If the point is that consumers have a right to expect, it is a mere conclusion about the
distinction between services and products, rather than a justification of it.
63. This is not always true in service transactions, but neither is it always true in cases involv-
ing accidents among strangers. The point is that the acute problems of proof in products cases as a
category are not as severe in service cases as a category. In this regard, service cases are more akin
to cases involving accidents among strangers.
64. See Powers, supra note 1, at 796-97.
65. See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alaska
1967); Gagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954) (en banc) (warranty); Hoffman v.
Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Inc., 528 P.2d 76 (Or. 1974). But see Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767
(1963) (warranty theory).
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scope of strict liability.66 Accordingly, courts should rely on this rationale to
determine whether specific hybrid cases are more like products (and governed
by strict liability) or are more like services (and governed by negligence).
B. The Product-Service Distinction in Hybrid Cases
If products cases are special because of their acute problems of proof, it
should be possible to resolve hybrid product-service cases in accordance with
this distinction. Courts should inquire in a hybrid case whether it is the type
of case that evokes the proof rationale of strict products liability.
This task could be accomplished at various levels of generality or specific-
ity. At one extreme, a court could examine an entire transaction-from the
perspective of proving specific acts of negligence-and determine whether it is,
as a whole, more like a service or a product. One test currently used by some
courts-the essence of the transaction test-adopts this type of approach, al-
though courts have not explicitly viewed the transaction from the perspective
of the proof rationale.67 A court following this approach would not differenti-
ate among separate portions of a transaction in determining whether it in-
volved a product or a service. For example, a plumber who installs a water
heater would be judged by a single test, regardless of whether the installation
or the water heater itself were defective.
A court, however, could scrutinize transactions in more detail to ascertain
the applicability of the proof rationale to its specific portions. For the plumber
who installs a water heater, defective installation might be considered a serv-
ice, since it occurred at a location accessible to the consumer after he had
selected the plumber. A defect in the water heater, however, would subject the
consumer to the obstacles of proof that make product injuries special, and
might therefore be governed by strict liability. For the water heater itself, the
plumber would be treated like a retailer of a defective product.68
Scrutinizing a hybrid transaction to ascertain the source of the defect has
been suggested by some courts and commentators. For example, in Barbee v.
66. Even the tangential rationales discussed earlier, supra note 61, must be discarded injuris-
dictions that exclude pure services from strict liability because each is as applicable to services as it
is to products.
67. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Allied Properties v. John
A. Blume & Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972); G-W-L, Inc. v.
Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982); Clay v. Yates, 25 L. J. Ex. 237, 239-40, 156 Eng. Rep.
1123, 1125-26 (1856).
One court has used the "essence of the transaction" test to define the scope of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, but not to define the scope of strict tort liability. Compare G-W-L,
Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (rex. 1982) (warranty) with Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342
(rex. 1968) (strict tort liability).
68. See Note, supra note 12, at 402-04. If the plumber installed a water heater that the con-
sumer had purchased elsewhere, strict liability would not be applicable to him because he would
not have "sold" the water heater. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
A single transaction could have two sources of defect, as in a case in which a plumber im-
properly installs a defective water heater. In such a case, the installation should be governed by
negligence, while the defect in the water heater should be governed by strict liability. It is also
possible for a product such as a water heater to be defective because it does not protect against
negligent installation. Again, each source of liability should be analyzed separately.
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Rogers69 the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply strict liability to an op-
tometrist who had improperly fitted a contact lens. Although the defendant's
practice of a regulated profession strongly influenced the court, it also relied
on the fact that "[t]he miscarriage . . . rests in the professional acts of [the
optometrists] and not in the commodity they prescribed, fitted and sold."'70
Although the court did not base this distinction on the proof rationale of strict
products liability, the nature of the defect did not present the plaintiff with the
special problem of tracing the defect to specific acts of negligence that oc-
curred at a remote time and place. Had the lens been made from impure
material, the proof rationale would have been implicated and the optometrist
might reasonably have been held strictly liable as a retailer.71
Courts could fine tune their analysis even further by asking in each spe-
cific fact situation whether the difficulty of proving specific negligent acts was
unduly burdensome. There may even be traditional product cases in which
the proof problems are not acute, such as an airplane that has been manufac-
tured under the scrutiny of independent safety inspectors. There also may be
pure service cases in which proof problems are serious, such as an appliance
that has been shipped back to the manufacturer for "assembly line" repairs.
This additional level of fine tuning, however, might create more unpredictabil-
ity than its additional flexibility is worth.72
The important point is that even if the proof rationale distinguishes serv-
ices from products, it can be applied at various levels of generality or specific-
ity. Scrutinizing a transaction more specifically than is contemplated by the
essence of the transaction approach is probably worth the trouble; the differ-
ence between installing a defective product and defectively installing a good
product is not especially difficult for courts to ascertain or for litigants to
predict.73
There is another type of hybrid case that is not as easy to analyze accord-
ing to the source of the alleged defect. Transactions such as the installation of
a water heater, the prescription of a contact lens, or the application of a hair
permanent are combinations of constituent parts that can be classified them-
selves fairly easily as product or service, but other transactions are not. For
69. 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968). See also Nastasi v. Hochman, 58 A.D.2d 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d
216 (1977); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974); Note, supra note
12, at 402-04.
70. Barbee, 425 S.W.2d at 346.
71. It is possible that the court would have relied on defendant's professional nature as a
factor that overrode all other issues. Putting aside the "professional" issue, it seems anomolous to
hold defendants to a stricter standard in situations in which they are less responsible for the defect,
but this is merely a concomitant of holding retailers liable for manufacturer's defects.
72. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 33, at 526-28; Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
351 (1973).
73. It sometimes may be difficult to determine either analytically or empirically whether the
installation or the product being installed was defective when the product's own design makes it
difficult to install. It is evident, however, that the plaintiff's claim about the product is governed
by one standard while the claim about the installation is governed by another.
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example, transmitting electricity74 and supplying contaminated water75 seem
to be homogeneous transactions, but they are still difficult to categorize as
product or service. Even here, a court might distinguish between causes of an
injury that are local and contemporaneous (such as failure to rectify a sagging
transmission line) and those that are remote and ancient (such as engineering
studies concerning the location of water wells). 76 But even though some cases
are not resolved easily, the proof rationale at least provides courts with a co-
herent, workable method of analyzing cases that are on the border between
products and services.
This analysis does not resolve the other issues presented by the hybrid
sales-service cases: whether professionals warrant special treatment, whether
the test in tort cases should be similar to the test in warranty cases, and
whether a product has been sold rather than merely used.77 But for one prob-
lem presented by the hybrid sales-service cases-whether a product or a serv-
ice is involved-this analysis presents a comprehensive approach that reflects
a coherent theory for strict products liability generally.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRODUCT-SERVICE DISTINCTION FOR PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
The hybrid sales-service cases are significant beyond their own immediate
resolution. Few courts carefully scrutinize the rationales for distinguishing be-
tween product injuries and other personal injuries. Although courts have re-
lied on numerous arguments to support strict products liability, few courts
have justified the selective application of strict liability to products cases. Only
the acute problems of proof in products cases can justify current law that both
excludes pure services from strict liability and denies recovery for injuries
caused by nondefective products. 78
This rationale has important implications for strict products liability be-
cause it does not intrinsically reject fault as a basis of liability. Rather, it uses
defectiveness as a surrogate for fault for "administrative" reasons. Dispensing
with the requirement that plaintiffs prove negligence reflects a decision that
negligence is too difficult to ascertain rather than a decision that blameless
defendants should be liable.79 According to this view, strict products liability
74. See, eg., Navarro County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.
1982); Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Co-op, 505 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
75. See, e.g., Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583 (rex. Civ. App. 1975).
76. Because time and location both contribute to proof problems, courts must decide whether
(1) both are necessary, (2) either is sufficient, or (3) an aggregate threshold of severity is needed to
implicate the proof rationale of strict liability.
77. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
78. This does not mean that the proof rationale is itself convincing. But if it is not, then no
rationale justifies current products liability law, and it should be altered or scrapped.
79. Retailers are normally blameless, and thus liability must rest on policies other than diffi-
culties of proof, such as difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction over remote manufacturers. See supra
note 49. This does not undermine fault as a basis of strict products liability, however, because
retailers normally can recover indemnity from manufacturers. Thus, they merely insure against
manufacturer's insolvency or bear the burden of tracking them down.
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is a form of negligence per se, which one court has explicitly recognized. 80
This rationale for strict products liability helps explain specific doc-
trines--such as the state of the art defense 8' and the unavoidable dangers de-
fense 82 -that excuse manufacturers when we are confident that they have not,
in fact, been negligent. Moreover, this rationale would mitigate drastically
problems courts have encountered coordinating strict liability and negligence
in cases involving comparative fault, either between a strictly liable defendant
and a negligent plaintiff, or among defendants seeking contribution, some of
whom are negligent and some of whom are strictly liable. Since strict liability
and negligence are not antithetical theories under this rationale for strict prod-
ucts liability, they could be unified more easily.83
Even if the proof rationale explains strict liability, however, it must be
evaluated on its own merits. Even if proof is more difficult in products cases
and an inference from defectiveness to negligence is sound, the proof problem
could be mitigated by other devices. For example, a doctrine similar to res ipsa
loquitur could be used to require manufacturers to prove freedom from
negligence. 84
I have argued elsewhere that an explicit recognition of fault as the basis of
liability in products cases would not be draconian and yet would mitigate nu-
merous current problems courts are facing in products liability.85 Without re-
peating that argument here, it is noteworthy that the present analysis of the
rationales for strict products liability suggests that product cases are not that
different from cases governed solely by negligence. This is not a surprising by-
product of analyzing hybrid sales-service cases, since they form a significant
portion of the boundary between strict products liability and negligence.
While most boundary problems involve some ambiguity, a coherent division
between groups of cases at least should have a boundary that responds to poli-
cies distinguishing the two groups. If a boundary cannot be maintained even
in theory, the groups of cases may not be meaningfully different. The diffi-
culty courts have encountered in distinguishing between products and services
reflects that products cases are not all that distinct in the first place. Although
products cases have significant aesthetic hallmarks, it is not easy to distinguish
them on policy grounds.
This does not deny the possibility of coherently distinguishing product
80. See Casrell v. Altec Indus. Inc., 335 So. 2d 128, 132-33 (Ala. 1976); Atkins v. American
Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 140 (Ala. 1976).
81. See supra note 47.
82. See supra note 46.
83. See Powers, supra note 1; General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
1977); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375, 389-90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (reversed
pending rehearing by Texas Supreme Court, see slip opinion, 26 TEx. Sup. CT. J. 507).
84. See Caterpiller Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 2d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal Rptr. 225 (1978). As with resipsa loquitur, a court could
adopt a variety of procedural positions. Compare Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 540 P.2d
33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975) (conclusive inference if defendant does not rebut) with George Foltis,
Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941) (permissive inference only).
85. See Powers, supra note 1, at 809-15.
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injuries from the remainder of personal injuries. Indeed, my thesis has been
that unique problems of proof can account for the special treatment of prod-
ucts cases and should be used to define the boundary between products and
services. But this rationale is itself debatable: it is not self-evident that the
problems of proof in products cases are so significant that they cannot be miti-
gated by shifting burdens of proof within the negligence system.
III. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the broader implications of the courts' difficulty in distin-
guishing between products and services, the specific problem of resolving hy-
brid sales-service cases requires attention. Courts have groped for ad hoc
solutions in specific circumstances, but they have not developed a comprehen-
sive approach. One source of difficulty has been the courts' failure to disen-
tangle the product-service issue from other issues typically presented by cases
involving services. A second source of difficulty has been that courts have
tried to distinguish between products and services without relying on the rea-
sons for treating product injuries specially.
The best explanation of the selective use of strict liability in products
cases is that plaintiffs face acute problems trying to prove remote acts of negli-
gence. Even if this rationale is rejected, however, a court should resolve hy-
brid sales-service cases according to its understanding of the rationale for
treating products cases distinctly. Not only will such an approach produce a
better resolution of hybrid sales-service cases, it will give us a better under-
standing of the nature of strict products liability.
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